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of honest.v
that new company is solvent and may
avail itself of the statutory provisions
to mutualization? I defy anyone to give an affirmative answer to this
question.
PnESENT PnocEEDING

Purporting to act under paragraph 20
of the rehabilitation and reinsurance agreement, a plan of mutualization
was formulated by the committee and, on September 22, 1950,
the iusurance commissioner found that the plan protected the
rights and interests of new company, its policyholders and
shareholders, and that he was satisfied that the plan would
be fair and equitable in its operation.
Paragraph 20(a) of the rehabilitation and reinsurance
agreement provides :
"Mutualization and Disposition of Stock of New Company
"(2) Neither the Conservator, nor, if one be appointed,
the Liquidator, of the Old Company, shall dispose of any of
the stock of the New Company except as follows:
"(a) At any time between July 1, 1946 and January 1,
1948, and thereafter so long as the Conservator or a Ijiquidator
of the Old Company may continue to hold any or all of said
stock, ten percent (10%) of the holders of participating
policies of life insurance entitled to vote at a policy holders'
election on a proposal for voluntary mutualization of the New
Company, whether those re-insured hereunder or those issued
by the New Company (each policy holder for this purpose
being reg·arded as one person regardless of the number of
policies owned or amount of insurance held) may request
the New Company to create an Appointing Committee as
hereinafter provided to exercise the duties and functions hereinafter specified in respect of a proposed volttntary mutualization of the New Company, in accordance with the laws of
the State of California in effect at the time of said request,
or, if said laws then so permit, of any one or more departments thereof. Such request shall specify the department or
departments of the New Company desired to be mutualized.
"Upon the receipt of such request the New Company shall
create an Appointing· Committee consisting of the then President of the Association of Life Insurance Presidents, the
President of Leland Stanford Jr. University, and the Provost
of the University of California at Los Angeles, or persons
occupying similar positions if their or any of their titles
shall have been changed. In the event any one or more of
such persons shall refuse or be unable to act, the remaining
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member or members shall fill the vacancy or vacancies thereby
created
their appointment in writing of another person
or persons of similar position and standing. If all of said
persons refuse or are unable to act, the Court or any Judge
thereof
on the application of the Commissioner, desCommittee consisting of three (3)
po:Sltlton and standing. Said Appointing
through not less than a majority of its
shall designate a Price Determination Committee
of not less than three and not more than five (5) persons
skilled in matters of insurance company valuation, which
through not less than a majority thereof,
shall determine whether in their opinion the proposed voluntary mutualization of the New Company, or of the department
or departments ther~of specified in said request can then be
practicably accomplished having due regard to the interests
of all persons interested in the New Company.* If it can
be determined that such mutualization is not then practicable
no further steps shall be taken in connection with a possible
mutualization of the New Company under the provisions of
this subparagraph until at least six months after the date of
such determination. If in the opinion of a majority of the
members of the committee such mutualization is then practicable, the committee shall determine the proper price to be
paid upon such mutualization and appropriate terms of payments thereof ; said determination shall not be made, however,
prior to January 1, 1947.
"If, at the date of the appointment of such committee
the New Company shall have in force Participating Life
Insurance written subsequent to the effective ~ate of this
g-r<;entertt in an amount in excess of its Non-Participating
I1ife Insurance written during the same period, one-half (%)
of such excess shall, for the purpose of fixing the proper
to be paid (but for no other purpose) be deemed to be,
and shall be valued as, Non-Participating Life Insurance.
If at the time of such appointment, there shall have been
transferred from the Participating Department in accordance
with the provisions of sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 6
less than ten percent (10%) of the then accrued
"'~~«"'"" described therein, or if there shall have been transferred to the Participating Department any working capital
pursuant to the
of subparagraph (c) of said para*The statutory scheme relating to insolvent companies is concerned
with the protection of those interested in the insolvent company.

stock
1nissioner that the purposes

it shall appear to the comsection 1011 can be best attained
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the mutmtlization
the comrnissioner
may fonmdate a plan for the 1n1llualization of such insnre1·."
(Emphasis added.)
All proceedings heretofore had in this litigation have been
as provided for in article 14 relating to insolvent and delinquent insurers. The rehabilitation agreement provides for
mutualization under the statutory scheme set up for solvent
insurers. The majority opinion states ''The new company is
solvent and nondelinquent, and there is no sonnet reason \Vhy
it should be mutualized under the statutes relating to insolvent insurers . . . . Section 1043
relat<•s to insolvents], which authorizes the commissioner to enter into rehabilitation agreements, contains no express limitation on
·what may be included in them, and srction 1037 [which also
relates to insolvents] provides that the enumeration of the
powers of the commissioner shall not be construed as a limitation upon him or upon his right to do such other acts as he
may deem necessary in connection with the handling of the
affairs of an insolvent company." (Emphasis added.) Thus
the majority opinion admits the procedure relating to insolvents was the one used and impliedly admits that it is the
correct procedure. However, in using the code sections relating to insolvents, the author then argues that these sections place no limitation upon· the commissioner. Section
1037 provides that the powers and authority of the commissioner in proceedings "under this article" (which relates to
insolvents) shall not be construed as a limitation on his right
to act or to do that "which he may deem necessary or expedient for the accomplishment or in aid of the purpose of
such proceedings.'' Then, citing section 1043 (relating again
to insolvents), we are told that the new company was properly
organized by the commissioner who ''evidently concluded''
that the protection of creditors and ''other interested parties''
could best be accomplished through the formation of a new
company ''divorced as far as possible from the control of
those who were in charge of the old company when it experienced financial difficulties.'' Then we are told that the
new company is a separate and distinct entity. \Ve are told
this without any discussion of the character of new company, and with only the unreasoned and unsupported dictum
in Garrison v. Pacific Mtd. L. Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1,
9-10 [187 P.2d 893], as authority therefor.
Section 11525 (the procedure followed here) provides for
'' Atdhorization to mutualize. A solvent domestic incorpo-

.fnnr 1!J:JG] PAcrnc J\IuT La'E hs. Co.
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rated insurer
a paid-in capital represented by outshares of r.apital stock and issuing, on a reserve
basis, nonassessable policies of life insurance or of both life
and
may convert itself into an incorpoor life and disability insurer,
nonassessable policies on a reserve basis. To that
end it
and carry ant a
for the acqtlisition
the
shares
its capital stock for the benefit
of its
or any class or classes of its policyholders,
by complying with the requirements of this chapter." (Emphasis added.)
The
is thus directly posed as to whether new company falls 1vithin the elassification of a "solvent" domestic
incorporated insurer which ''may convert itself into an incorporated mutual life insurer" which "may provide and
carry out a plan for the acquisition of the outstanding shares
of it:;; capital stock for the benefit of its policyholders."
NEw Co:i\iPANY
New company ~was organized by the insurance commissioner
''with a name similar to that of the old company as a corporate agent to assist him in carrying on the business of the
old company" (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10
Ca l.2d 807, 824, 825 17 4 P.2d 761]). lt was also said there
( p. i327) that "'I' he proce<><1ing was had uuder sections
1010 to 1061 of the Insurance Code which specially deal with
the rehabilitation and liquidation of insurance companies.
Those sections set up a comprehensive statutory scheme to
accomplish those results. The proceeding is not one in which
another party is prosecuting another party at all. It is
sim11ly a proceeding in which the state is invoking its power
over a corporate entity permitted by tbe state to engage in a
bnsiness vitally affected with the public interest upon condition of continuing compliance with the requirements proYided by the state. It is not a controversy between private
parties bnt a proceeding by the state in the interest of the
public." Sre also Caminctti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
22 Cal.2d 77, 82 [13G P.2d 779], where it was hrld that
"The new company wns the corporate agency of the Insurance Commissioner as conservatm· for the purpose of contiml'ing and prcscnving the business of the old rompany."
(Emphasis added.)
'rhe commissioner held, either as conservator or later as
liquidator, the entire capital stock of new company until
CHARACTER OF

added.)
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is formulated, as hol<lee of all the
IH· vote:-; for the plan.
'l'h<>n, as eommissimwr, he approves the plan as fair aml equiopinion that ''it mnst be
table. \Ve are told by the
assumed that the Legislature realized that the eommissioner
might be required to pass upon the fairness of a plan in a case
·where he, aeting as conservator, hacl previously consented to
mutualization on behalf of the stockholders." Nothing of the
kind must be assumed. It is obvious from even a casual reading of the eode provisions n'lating to insolYent companies
(1043 et seq.) and those relating to solvent companies (11525
et seq.} that the Legislature had not the faintest thought that
the two v;oulcl be so commingled as they are in this case, or
that the commissioner would be
in a position where he
was forced to approve a plan to be formulated some 10 years in
the future, then, when the plan was formulated forced to vote
an approval of it as a sole stockholder, and still later, to give
his approval of something he hacl theretofore twice before
approved.
Ever since the iuception'B of the receivership proceedings
and the organization of new company all the parties and
proceedings concerned in the rehabilitation matter have been
subject to the continuing jurisdiction and supervision of the
court. It has been pointed out in various phases of this litigation that new company was organized by the commissioner as
his cor·pomte agent to rehabilitate the business of old company. -without the original proceeding under section 1011 (d)
of the Insurance Code, new company would not have come
into being.
It is necessary, next, to note the difference in methods provided for in the two diYisions of the Insurance Code for
mutualization of insolvent and solvent companies.
Section 1046 provides that ''Said mutualization plan [called
inYoluntary mutualization for insolvent companies and follows the section ( 1045) which provides: "If at any time after
the 1'ssuance of an order ttnder· section 1011" the "commissioner" shall formulate a plan of mutualization] shall include
provisions for:
"(a) [Acquisition of capital stock.] The acquisition by
such insurer of all outstanding shares of its capital stock at a
price and upon terms and conditions to be fixed as hereinafter
provided.
*(With the exception of the present proceeding to be hereinafter
discussed.)

June 1955]
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[Retirement of capital stock.] The retirement of
shares of
when acquired by such insurer.
"
[Amendment of
The amendment of the
charter of such insurer so as to enable it to transact its business as a mutual insurer
nonassessable policies on a
reserve basis.
''
[Payment of
The manner in which and the
matured
time within which, after mutualization is
and maturing claims against such insurer shall be paid to the
lawful holders
"
[Submission of plan to policyholders.] The submission of said mutualization plan to the policyholders of such
insurer nuder such procedure as shall be set forth in the plan
or prescribed by said court, for their approval or rejection.
"(f) [Notice to shareholders.] Notice to the shareholders
of such insurer, in such manner and at such time after the
approval of said mutualization plan by said policyholders,
as the court may direct."
Section 1048 provides that after the formulation of the
mutualization plan, the commissioner shall submit it to the
court for its order directing the submission thereof to the
policyholders named in subdivision
of section 1046.
Section 11526 (relating to solvent insurers) provides that
''Such plan shall include appropriate proceedings for amending the insurer's articles of incorporation to give effect to the
acquisition, by said
for the benefit of its policyholders
or any class or classes thereof, of the outstanding shares of
its capital stock and the conversion of the insurer from a
stock corporation into a nonstock corporation for the benefit
of its members. The members of such nonstock corporation
shall be the policyholders from time to time of the class or
classes for whose benefit the stock of the insurer was acquired,
and no other persons. Such plan shall be:
"(a) Adopted by a vote of a majority of the directors.
[As distinguished from the formation thereof by the commissioner as provided in section 1045.]
'' (b) Approved by the vote of the holders of at least a
majority of the outstanding shares at a special meeting of
shareholders called for that purpose, or by the written consent of such shareholders. [As distinguished from section
1048 requiring the connnissioner to obtain court approval
and an order of the court directing the submission of the plan
to the policyholders.]
'' {c) · Submitted to the commissioner and approved by him

:seetion
conm:nssroner 's
would then be submitted to the court for its order directing the submission of
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the mutualization plan to the shareholders and policyholders
of the seized insurer for their vote of approval, or disapproval
as the case might be ( § 1046, subds. (e) and
) . Old company, not having been dissolved, still exists; new company
was organized as the corporate agent of the commissioner to
rehabilitate the business of old company with the assets of
old company. New company
as it appears, be considered as a completely independent and solvent organization
under the facts here prevailing. As I have pointed out, the
commissioner holds the entire beneficial interest in all the
capital stock of new company for the benefit of stockholders,
policyholders and creditors of old company; the legal title
to the stock of new company is held by voting trustees who
vote it as directed by the commissioner. As I have also
pointed out, the board of directors of new company are under
the close supervision, control and direction of the commissioner and must, in reality, take orders from him as to every
major, and some minor, business details. It cannot be said
that this close supervision, control and direction exist in the
usual ''solvent'' corporation.
CoRPORATE ENTI'l'Y OF NEw CoMPANY
Respondents argue that the corporate entity of new company cannot be disregarded so as to· make the proposed
mutualization a mutualization of old company. In support
of this contention, In t"e Bond & JJ!Iortg. Gnar. Corp., 157 Misc.
240 [283 N.Y.S. 623, 652], and Gat·rison v. Paci.fic JJ!ttt. L. Ins.
Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1, 9-10 [187 P.2d 893], are cited. In
neither case was mutualization involved. In the Bond &
Mortgage Guarantee case, the superintendent of insurance had
organized Bond & JYiortgage Guarantee Corporation ''as a
domestic insurance corporation, with a capital of $1,000,000,
a surplus of $2,000,000, and a reserve for contingencies of
$200,000, all of which was paid out of the assets of the guarantee co·mpany in exchange for the entire capital stock of the
new corporation, 10,000 shares of the par value of $100 each ;
a certificate for said number of shares was issued in the name
of the guarantee corn.pany and is held by the superintendent
of insurance as an asset, for the benefit of the creditors (including the policyholders), of the guarantee company." (Emphasis added.) The guarantee corporation here involved took
on the duty of insuring mortgages, "but on a restricted basis
under a limited policy of guaranty." (Pp. 641, 650.) This
case involved a proceeding whereby the People, and certain
individuals interested, applied for an order enjoining the
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Statr
Commission from demanding and receiving
or assuming control of certain mortgages being serviced by
the guarantee
pursuant to court order. The injunction was granted. The contention was that the guarantee
corporation, in servicing mortgages, was acting without adequate corporate powers. The court held that the corporation
was acting within its
and, in ans·wer to the
contention that the
corporation was a state agency
inseparable from the superintendent of insurance (so as to
permit another state agency, the ::VIortgage Commission, which
came into being
the proceedings set forth had been
had) to take it over, the court said: "Said corporation is
like any other corporation; a distinct entity. All of its stock
is owned by guarantee company, and the certificate therefor
is held in the custody of the superintendent; this he holds as
he does any other assets of the company in rehabilitation, as a
receiver designated by statute for the benefit of the creditors
and stockholders of said company; not as an owner, representing the state. It is a stock corporation. having been created,
for one thing, with a view to its possible sale for the benefit
of the creditors, as its exhaustive by-laws make apparent.
During such time as the stock control remains as it is, the
operation of the corporation is to be under the supervision of
the superintendent as rehabilitator." (Emphasis added.)
The court continued and said that the primary management
of the corporation was with the board of directors, although it
was subject to the supervision of the superintendent "in
his capacity as supervisor of insurance companies" (pp. 651,
652). The situation presented in the New York case and
that presented in the case at bar are factually similar up to
a point. I have heretofore quoted extensively from Caminett1:
v. Paoific 21Iut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 344, at page 356 [139
P.2d 908], wherein we set forth the extensive and minute
supervision exercised by the commissioner over new company. 'rhis supervision exceeded by far anything required
of him as ''supervisor of insurance companies.'' We also
said in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 307,
324, 325 [74 P.2d 761], that new company was organized
"as a corporate agent to assist him [commissioner] in carrying on the business of the old company." (See also Caminetti
v. Pacific Mnt. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 77, 80 [136 P.2d 779] .)
In Garrison v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1
[187 P .2d 893], the court said, "The question for decision
is whether an insurance company which was organized to

agency
does not ~v,.,~v''""·'
old company. In
existence but for
pany.
from the
with the
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in that
of the Insurance Code relating to involuntary
mutualization of insolvent companies. The stock of new company, held now by voting trustees, with beneficial ownership
in the commissioner is still held by him for the benefit of
the policyholders and creditors of old company. This fact
cannot be
; nor can the rights of the policyholders
and creditors of old company be disregarded. In holding
that new company is "utterly distinct" from old company
for aU purposes, a majority of this conrt chooses to forget
all the facts concerning this litigation and pretends that new
company >vas organized as any other insurance company with
its own assets and liabilities, that the insurance commissioner
had only the normal, nominal, supervision over its affairs, and
that no insolvency proceedings had ever been involved. In
the light of the record before us, such a holding cannot
stand the test of honest scrutiny.
REs JuDICATA
Respondents argue that it has been decided by the superior
court that the commissioner had authority to include in a
rehabilitation agreement an option to mutualize the new company by voluntary proceedings and to agree to dispose of the
stock of new company at the price, and on the terms, fixed
by the price determination committee; and that this court
has decided that the superior court had jurisdiction to so
decide and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
in approving the rehabilitation agreement.
In the commissioner's answering brief (p. 61) is found
this statement: "It is true that no attack seems to have been
made on the mutualization provisions [of the rehabilitation
agreement] in any of the appellate proceedings, but the courts
have taken notice of them in determining various appeals.''
Neither this court, nor an appellate court, has been concerned
in any of this litigation with the mutualization provisions of
the rehabilitation agreement as will hereinafter appear.
In Carpente1· v. Pacific JJ1ut. L. Ins. Co., 10 CaL2d 307,
322 [74 P.2d 761], we said that the plan of rehabilitation
provided for "Ultimate mutualization, in the event the policyholders so elect.'' \lv e were there concerned in the main with
the organization of new company as the corporate agent of
the commissioner to rehabilitate the business of old company.
In Carpenter v. Pacific JJ1ut. L. Ins. Co., 13 Cal.2d 306 [89
P .2d 637], we were concerned with the validity of the "Order
for Liquidation'' and the mutualization provisions of the plan
were not considered. In Carpenter v. Pacific JJ1ut. L. Ins. Co.,
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14 Ca1.2d 704 I DG l'.2d 7!!G], In' wen, c·ow·erncd with an
order of the trial conrt correcting its
nunc pro tnnc.
In Caminefti v. Pacific ;1Jut. L. Tns.
22 Ca1.2(l 77 [l:lG
P.2d 77D], ·we W<,re concenwd with the claims of
policyholders and, once again, the mutualization provisions
were not considered. In Caminctti v. Pacific lJlnt. L. Ins.
22 Ca1.2d
3;):\ [139 P.2d HOS j, we were eoncemed with
the propriety of creating a voting trust with the• stock of
new company under the provisions of seetiou 10:37, subdivision
(e), of the Tnsuranec Code. \Ve sai<l there that "To adopt
the eontention that seetion 1037
was not iniended to
apply to stoek of an insuranee company organized as a. medium
thr011gh which relwbilitation of the business of a
ins1trer was to be accomplished would require 11s to disregard
the clear language of the statute. Section 1087
specifically
refers to stock issued to the commissioner 'as conservator or
as liquidator in connection with a rehabilitation or reinsurance agreement.' " (Emphasis added.) \V c also said there
(p. 355) that the rehabilitation agreement (Pamgraph 20)
related to the "ultimate status and ownership of the new company.'' \Ve then pointed out that subdivision (a) (Paragraph
20) authorizes the commissioner to dispose of the stock in accordanee with ''any plan of mntualization thereafter adopted
by the policyholders of the new eompaHy, and such a disposition may inelude a transfer to voting trnstcl'S if the plan of
mutualization so provides.'' \Ve helrl that the voting trust
agreement was not a disposal of the stoek within the meaning
or purpose of Paragraph 20 of the rehabilitation agreement
and we said ( p. 358) that "It is trnce that the words 'dispose
of' are used in subdiYision (a) of paragraph 20 in conneetion with an authorization to the commissioner to transfer
the stock of the new eompany to voting trustees in aecon1anee with a plan of mutualization. But 1·t is clear that undet·
that s11bdivLsion the transfer there pr·ovidecl for woulrl r·eqnire
ct complete alienation of the stock in order to carry out the plan
of mutualization contemplated therein." (Emphasis added.)
Again, the validity of the mutualization procedure >vas not
passed upon; the only holding being that the rehabilitation
agreement did not preelude the creation of the yoting trust.
[n Caminetti v. Pacific JJ!nt. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2c1 :386 [139
P.2d H30], we were coneerncd with disqualification of a judge
and a party's waivrr thereof. Mutualization was not considered. In Cmm:netti v. Pacific ll:lut. L. Ins. Co., 23 Cal.2d 94
!142 P.2d 741], we were concerned with the correctness of the
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'fhe
are in disagreement as to whether or not the
mutualization provisions were litigated at the time the order
of December 4, 1936, was made. The insurance commissioner
says that '' P1·esumably these provisions did not go entirely
unchallenged in the proceedings leading up to the Order of
Hchabilitation." (Emphasis added.) (Insurance commissionbrief, p. 61.) New company asserts that the
's
"validity" of the rehabilitation agreement was put in issue
an<l decided by the order of December 4, 1936, and that the
same has been approved by this court. From all that appears,
it is obvious that the preeise question here involved has never
been passed upon. It most eertainly has not been passed upon
by an appellate eourt, or by this eourt. Hespondent, new eompany, points to the following quotations from the pleadings
in the original proeeeding as showing that the mutualization
provisions of paragraph 20 (a) were litigated. ''.Answer of
Certain Interveners to Petition for Approval of Second Proposed Hehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement, Folios 27572759 of Transcript on Appeal. L.A. 16182:
'' 'fhat said plan, if exeeuted, would be entirely void and of
no effeet, and would not be binding upon the partie!'l thereto,
and that the execution of the same is beyond the authority
of the said Samuel L. Carpenter, Jr., as Insuranee Commissioner of the State of California and as Conservator of The
Pacifie Mutual Life Insurance Company of California [old
eompany], and that the execution of said agreement and the
transfer of the assets by the said Insurance Commissioner is
wholly unauthorized by the Insurance Code of the state of
California and is entirely beyond the power of the said Samuel
L. Carpenter, Jr., as Insurance Commissioner and as Conservator as aforrsaid, and the said agreement will be void
when executed and beyond the power of the Insurance Commissioner under the statute in such cases made and provided
and that the said agreement is of no binding effect whatever
on any of the parties thereto and that any acts done pursuant
thereto are wholly null and void.''
''.Amended Complaint in Intervention of Certain Intervenors, Folio 3882 of Transcript on .Appeal, L.A. 16182:
''That the approval of said agreement is beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court and, if given, would
be void and of no force and effect, for the reason that authority
therefor is not given in, and, in fact, is forbidden by, the
terms and provisions of said Insurance Code of California,
and, in particular, of articles is [sic] and 14 of chapter 1 of
part 2 of division 1 thereof.''
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It appears to me that whu t was
these pleadings was that the
was said to be beyond the commissioner's power siuee that
yras the major issue in Car-penter· v. Pacific Mnt. L. Ins. Co.,
10 Cal.2d 307 [74 P.2d 761].
The next question that arises is whether or not the provisions for mutualization could have been
in that
proceeding inasmuch as mutualization was not to take place
until between 1946 and 1948, or ''so long as the Conservator
or a Liquidator of the Old Company may continue to llold any
or all of said stock . . . . " (Paragraph 20 (a), rehabilitation
agreement.) The proposed voluntary mutualization plan was
also to be in accordance "with the laws of the State of California in effect at the time of said request. . . . '' The plan
was also not to be proposed unless the price determination
committeee ''shall determine whether in their opinion the
proposed voluntary mutualization of the New Company . . .
can then be practicably accomplished . . . . " In Silva v.
City & County of San Fr-ancisco, 87 Cal.App.2d 784 [198
P.2d 78], a county board of supervisors passed a resolution
that certain land of plaintiff's should be acquired when necessary. Plaintiff sued for a declaration as to the value of his
property. ']'he court, in refusing to place plaintiff's valuation
on the property, declared: ''The court may take judicial
knowledg·e that real estate values do not remain constant.
The value fixed during the present period may be disproportionate to what should be paid when the recreation department of the city decides to use the property as part of a
'playground.' Plaintiff seeks a final determination that the
property is worth $10,000 and that if and when defendant
thooses to take the property this will be the amount it must
pay." (Emphasis that of tllc court.) It was also said that
'' . . . the present complaint alleges in substance that the
value of the property may be determined through condemnation proceedings when defendant deems it 'necessary.' The
only deelaratory judgment that could be rendered under the
allegations of the complaint would be of an advisory naturenamely, that when defendant deems it necessary to institute
condemnation proceedings the price be fixed at the then
market value." (Pp. 788-789.)
In Young v. Young, 100 Cal.App.2d 85, 87 [223 P.2d 25],
it was held that an action to establish a foreign decree of
divorce in California, and for ratification by the California
eourt of a property settlement included in the foreign de-

or
'then
the
that the statute or charter
be evaded and set at naught. The
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court "could
at the time it enterrd its

prove or
mutualization
the commissioner.

out that to so interpret the order
of section 1037, subdivision
securing to all interested
. '' Appellants have not
'' in its true sense.
contend that the order of the comthe
of mutualization was subject to
the superior court. It is argued that
the commissioner, in
his order, acted in a judicial
capacity rather than in an administrative or legislative capacity as contended by
Appellants contend that in
reviewing a decision or order of a statewide administrative
agency or of a state officer, the superior court must reweigh
the evidence and determine for itself according to its independent judgment whether or not the decision is supported
by the weight or preponderance of the evidence in every case
where state judicial functions are involved. They rely upon
Thomas v.
Stab. Corn., 39 Cal.2d 501, 504
[247 P.2d 561] ; Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32
Cal.2d 301, 308 [196 P.2d 20] ; Laisne v. California State Board
of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d
834-835 [123 P.2d 457] ; and
Drummey v. State Board
Funeral Directors & Embalmers,
13 Cal.2d 75
P.2d
Respondents, on the other hand,
argne that the commissioner's order was an exercise of executive pmver and >vas not the exercise of such full judicial
power as to entitle appellants to have the trial court exercise
its independent judgment ·with respect to the weight of the
evidence. I\espondents rely upon the cases of Bank of Ita~y
v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1 [251 P. 7841; Doble Steam 1~1otors
Corp. v. Dcmghc-1·ty, 195 Cal. 158 [232 P. 140]; JJfcDonmtgh
v. Goodcell, ]3 Cal.2d 741 [91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205],
and Southern
Jockey Cl11.b, Inc. v. California etc. Racing
Board, 36 Cal.2d 167 [223 P .2d 1].
The duties of the commissioner, as set forth in section
12921 l1ave been held to be "that of a minister of the court

tween lit
but he nets as
evrr to judicial
of power or
eomm1sswner as a reease,
N~ivcr of the assets of insurance
and slat<:rl that
he clid not derive his power from
but from the
statute.
'fhe distinetion in the two lines of eases relied npon by
appellants and respondents is that m those relied upon by
appellants an
vested
was extingnished,
or taken away, by the ll(tministrati'I'C order. For example,
in the Drumme.v ease (12 Cal.2d
and \Yilson
had bee11 duly lieensrc1 embalmers and the State Board of
Funeral Directors and Embalmers ordered their licenses suspemled. 'fhis eonrt held that it IYWl
with a statute
whirh conferred certain faet-finding powers on a board rxereising statewide jurisdiction and that there ':ras no "indication that the legislature iutended the l'aets so found to be
binding on the conrts'': that no method of review was provided in the statute. \Ye held that \Ye could see no escape
from the conclusion that in such a
the court to
·which the application for wandate is made mnst ·weigh the
evide1Jce, and exerei:w its
on the facts
as \Yell as the law, if the
his constitutional rights under thr state and fed ern l Constitutions. "The state constitutional
disenssrd, supra,
prohibits the confrrring of judicial pmwr on such administratiYe boards" (p. 84).
In Loisne v. California Slate Board
supra,
tltr California State Boanl of Optometry had revoked r_,aisne 's
eertificate of registration to practice
in this state.
\V(• held there tJ1at "Oll ihe authority of the Drummey case
the onl.v type of review that would afford appellant his full
eonstitutional rights would be a
trial de noyo as
ontlined in the d('Cision in that ease." (P. 843.)
In Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, the State

company
in the
'"''""''w for
the benefit of the
and stockholders of
old company ( Caminetti v. Paeijic Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d

power on such administra-

Co. v. United
298 U.S.
, the court stated: ''Legisqualifications, work in a field
demands. Some may be expert
subservient. It is not difficult for
of law in
a hearing
to say that their findings of
fact may be made eollC:lusive 1Dhcrc constitutional rights of
are
although the evidence
clearly establishes that the
are wrong and constitutional
have been i11
is to place those rights at
the mercy of administrative officials and seriously to impair
the
inherent iu our
safeguards. That prosof administrative agencies, is
It is said that we can retain
rxamine the \Yeight of evidence when
concerns the right of prrsonal liberty. But if
this be so, it is not because we are privileged to perform our
judicial
in that case and for reasons of convenience to
disregard it in others. 1'he
applies when rights
e1~ther of persons or
property are protected by constitutional restrictions. lTnder our system there is no warrant for
the view that the
power of a competent court can
be circumscribed
any legislative arrangement designed to
give effect to administrative action going beyond the limits
" (Emphasis added.) This case
of constitutional
and this statement were relied upon by us in the Drummey
case
13 Cal.2d
85) and no information has been
presented to me to show that the rule there set forth has
No clearer case than this could
been in any way
possibly be found to illustrate the evils to be avoided. Old
eompany stockholders and policyholders have been, and are,
at the "mercy" of administrative officials; those officials may,
during the last 10 years, have been either ''expert and impartial'' or ''subservient.''
I have heretofore set forth at length the self-evident fact
that appellants are
of vested property rights of
which they are being deprived. In Ohio Valley Water Co. v.
Ben Avon Bonmgh, 253 U.S. 287, 289 [40 S.Ct. 527, 641J.Ed.
908], it was held: ''The order here involved prescribed a
complete schedule of maximum future rates and was legislative in character. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211
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345, Gi3 L.Bd.
In all r:;uch ea>WR, if
owner claims confiscation
his
the state rwust
a
opportunity for
tribunal
determination upon its own
as to both law and
: otherwise the order
in conflict with the due pnJCess
~Jlissouri Pew. Ry. Co.
v. Georgia,
961, 57 L.Ed. 1507] ; Wadley Soutlwrn
; 111issouri
235 U.S. 651, 660, 661 [35 S.Ct.
hEd.
S.Ct. 715,
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 241
538
252 u.s.
60 L.Ed. 1148] ; Okl.aJwnw
added.)
331 [ 40 S.Ct. 338, 64 L.Ed.
Appellants here complain
ization plan provides that thr
to he paid for new company's stock (of which they are the
owners) is
$3,000,000 \rhile that sanw amount vms originally taken out
of old company's fnnc1s to purchase new
stock and,
in addition, all the other assets of old company
$200,as going agency or000,000 in assrts plns such
ganization and concern, good ·will,
"vmrth several millions of dollars" [Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10
Cal.2d 307, 325 (74 P.2d 761)]) were turned over to new company! It surely must be crystal clear to everyone who can
think that such an outrageous confiscation of property without due process of law has never before taken place in this
state.
EVIDENCE

In the trial court the evidence consisted of all of the record
of the proceedings before the insurance commissioner, consisting of the reporter's daily
the exhibits and
the commissioner's decision. Appellants contend that they
were prohibited from introducing
or offering to
do so, because of the rulings of the trial court ; that no issues
of fact were litigated; that the court ruled that it was not
empowered to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence taken before the commissioner. Respondents state that
appellants were given leave to serve and file a motion and
affidavits relative to the introduction of additional evidence
and failed to do so. 'l'he memorandum opinion and order
(,July 2, 1951, Olk Tr., 237-239) contains this statement:
''After a careful study of the briefs submitted and the au-

eonclusion to be drawn from
the facts of this case is that appellants were possessed of a

holders of

t!1P

"In m;merous

solven1 compan;~~
s.-at,•mrnt is formd

·where the

of11eer was YlCeC'SSary fo

1WCI'CIIf

h1s participation has been
44 C.2d-25

scheme,
althongh the g-rounds for

C.2d

scheme'' \Yas
scheme is
scheme for rehabilitation of insolvent
of the interested

mueh.
carried

IS

for mntualizat ion of solYent
am also of the opinion that
rehabilitation
determined
of the present
a separability clause in the rehabilitation
and that
nothing heretofore done
this, or an appellate court, will
be affected
a holding
this court that the parties may
not yalidly eontract to mutualizP new company contrary to
the applicable statutory provisions.
(3) There should have been a trial de novo in the superior
court where evidence relative to the proper method to be
used by the price determination committee, or co1u~t-appointed
appraisers, could have been introdueed
both sides and a
determination made
a judicial trier of fact. Both appellants and respondents here devote many pages of their numerous briefs to such material. Such methods are obviously
matters for experts in the field of insurance and should be
the
of
in the trial court.
If, as I firmly believe, the procedure for involuntary
mutualization of insolvent companies is the proper procedure,
sections 1049, 1050, 1051 and 1052 of the Insurance Code
contain detailed provisions for hearings and the appointment
by the court of appraisers to appraise ''the then outstanding
shares of the capital stock of such insurer, without regard to
any appreciation or depreciation arising out of said mutualization plan as so approved or modified. Such appraisement shall
fix the reasonable value of such shares of capital stock, ineluding the goodwill, if any, of such insurer, and shall state
the value, if any, assigned to such goodwill; and if the
appraisers shall have found that such insurer has no goodwill,
such finding shall be stated. Such appraisement, when confirmed by said court, shall be final and conclusive." ( § 1051.)
'l'he use of the involuntary mutualization procedure for an
insolvent company follows logically from the original proceeding under sections 1010 and 1011. It should be noted
that section 1054 (still under the Insolvency and Delinquency
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that:
shall be a contimwt1:on
tu,alization shall not

insurer,
and such rnuor contracts
1rwtualization
as
shall exercise all the
classes of insuranee written
to
m u tualizati on

Mnt. L. Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d
307, 334
P.2d 761], that "reinsurance" was a contract
which one company
takes over the insurance risks of another company (old
and becomes
substituted as an insurer in the place and stead of the original
insurer. 'l'his holding is also the
result of following
the
outlined in the
and Delinquency
division of the Insuranee Code.
F'rom what Mr. ,Jnstice Traynor has said in his dissent
and for the reasons heretofore set forth
me, the conclusion is inescapable that the
should be reversed.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the discussion, the
reasoning and the conclusions of Mr. ,Justice Carter.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied July 27,
1955.
.T.,
,J., and Schauer, ,T., were of the
shmtld be
that the

